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Abstract
In Navas and Mar´ın-Solano (2008) the coincidence between Nash and Stack-
elberg equilibria for a modified version of the differential game model first pro-
posed by Lancaster (1973) was proved. However, important restrictions on the
value of the parameters of the model were included, in order to obtain an inte-
rior solution. In this paper we extend the previous result, in the limit when the
discount rate is equal to zero, by eliminating the restrictions and taking into
account corner solutions.
Resum
En Navas i Mar´ın-Solano es va demostrar la coincide`ncia entre els equilibris
de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versio´ modificada del joc diferencial proposat
por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solucio´ interior, es van
imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels para`metres del model. En
aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el l´ımit en que la taxa de descompte e´s
igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.
JEL classification: C73; H21; H32
Keywords: Nash/Stackelberg equilibria; optimal profit taxation; time con-
sistency
2
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the coincidence between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
for an extension of the Lancaster capitalism model (Lancaster (1973), Pohjola
(1983), de Zeew (1992)), which was later on adapted to analyze an optimal
taxation policy problem in Gradus (1989).
We consider the following differential game. There are two players. The
control (decision) variable of Player 1 is u (t) ∈ [b, c], with 0 < b < c < 1. The
control variable of Player 2 is v (t) ∈ [0, 1]. The state of the system is described
by the state variable K(t) (the stock of capital), which evolves according to
K˙ = aK (1− u) v , K (0) = K0 > 0 . (1)
The objective of the two agents are, for Player 1,
max
u
{
J1 =
∫ T
0
aKudt+ αK(T )
}
(2)
and, for Player 2,
max
v
{
J2 =
∫ T
0
aK (1− u) (1− v) dt+ (1− α)K(T )
}
. (3)
In the Gradus optimal taxation model, Players 1 and 2 are government and
firms, u represents the taxes on the profits of the firms, a is the the ratio profit-
stock of capital, and α can be seen as a net wealth tax rate applied at the end of
the time horizon. In the capitalism model (Lancaster (1973)), Players 1 and 2
represent workers and capitalists, u is the share of consumption in total output
of workers, and α plays a role similar to the one by u at the end of the planning
horizon. In both models, v is the investment rate of capitalists or firms.
The model falls within the class of trilinear differential games (see Clemhout
andWan (1974)), which have the property that the open-loop and feedback Nash
equilibria coincide. Moreover, as it is argued in Basar et al (1985), the feedback
Nash and Stackelberg solutions with Player 1 as the leader also coincide for this
class of differential games. In Navas and Mar´ın-Solano (2008) it was proved
that, for certain values of the parameters of the model (those guaranteeing the
existence of interior solutions), Player 1 can choose the parameter α in such a
way that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium (with Player 1 as the leader)
coincides with the Nash equilibrium, so the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium
becomes time consistent. Moreover, this value of α maximizes the payments
for the two players when the other time consistent nonooperative equilibria
are considered. In this paper we generalize this result (in the limit when the
discount rate is equal to 0) by relaxing the conditions of the model in the sense
that corner solutions are permitted.
3
2 Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium: Player 1
as the leader
Nash equilibrium. For the derivation of the open-loop Nash equilibrium (and
hence the other equilibrium solutions) for the differential game defined by (1-3)
we consider the Hamiltonian functions H1 = aKu+ p1aK(1− u)v and
H2 = aK(1− u)(1− v) + p2aK (1− u) v , (4)
where p1 and p2 are the corresponding co-state variables. The maximum of H1
in u is achieved when u∗ = b if p1v > 1, and u∗ = c if p1v < 1. The maximum
in v of H2 is achieved when v∗ = 0 if p2 < 1, and v∗ = 1 if p2 > 1. In addition,
the following set of differential equations must be satisfied:
p˙1 = −∂H1
∂K
= −a [u+ p1(1− u)v] , p1(T ) = α , (5)
p˙2 = −∂H2
∂K
= −a [1 + (p2 − 1) v] (1− u) , p2(T ) = (1− α) . (6)
Note that p1(t) and p2(t) are continuous and strictly decreasing functions. We
assume that p2(0) > 1 (if p2(0) ≤ 1, the dynamics is obtained as a truncated
analysis of the previous case). From (6), p2(tN2 ) = 1 if, and only if,
tN2 = T −
α
a(1− c) .
For every t ∈ (tN2 , T ], u∗(t) = c, v∗(t) = 0, and K(t) = Ks (constant).
Let t ∈ [0, tN2 ). Then v∗(t) = 1, and u∗(t) = b if p1(t) > 1, u∗(t) = c if
p1(t) < 1. Since p1(t) is strictly decreasing, there exists at most a moment
tN1 ∈ [0, tN2 ) such that p1(tN1 ) = 1. If p2(0) > 1 ≥ p1(0), u∗ = c for every
t ∈ [0, T ]. For the general case when p1(0), p2(0) > 1 we consider two cases:
1. If α > 1− c, p1(tN2 ) ≥ 1, u∗(t) = b if t ∈ [0, tN2 ), and u∗(t) = c if t ∈ [tN2 , T ].
2. If α < 1− c, p1(tN2 ) < 1 and there exists tN1 ∈ (0, tN2 ) such that p1(tN1 ) = 1.
For every t ∈ [0, tN1 ), u∗(t) = b; and for every t ∈ (tN1 , T ], u∗(t) = c. Since
p1(tN2 )− 1 = (α+ c− 1)/(1− c), from (5) the switching point tN1 is given by
tN1 = t
N
2 +
1
a(1− c) ln [c+ α] .
Open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium: Player 1 as the leader. For the res-
olution of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium, we follow an approach similar
to the one in de Zeeuw (1992). Let us analyze the problem of the follower, whose
Hamiltonian function is given by (4). The dynamics of the state and costate
variables K and p2 is described by (1) and (6). We assume that p2(0) > 1. Since
p2(T ) < 1 and p2(t) is a strictly decreasing continuous function, there exists a
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unique moment tS2 ∈ [0, T ] such that p2(tS) = 1. For t < tS2 , v∗(t) = 1, and for
t > tS2 , v
∗(t) = 0. By integrating (6) along the interval t ∈ (tS2 , T ] we obtain∫ T
tS2
u dt = T − tS2 −
α
a
. (7)
Now, in the problem for the leader, since the switching point tS2 defines the
change of the investment strategy for the follower, from (2) and (7) we obtain
JS1 =
∫ tS2
0
aKudt+
∫ T
tS2
aKudt+αK(T ) =
∫ tS2
0
aKudt+aK
(
tS2
) [
T − tS2
]
. (8)
Player 1 will choose the control variable u(t), t ∈ [0, tS2 ) (tS2 ≤ T ), which max-
imizes (8), with the constraints (7) and K˙ = aK(1 − u), K(0) = K0 > 0. The
terminal time tS2 is free. Since u ∈ [b, c], tS2 is bounded, tS2 ∈ [T − α/(a(1 −
c)), T − α/(a(1− b))], to be able to meet (7). We have to study two cases.
Case 1: Interior solution. If tS2 ∈ (T − α/(a(1 − c)), T − α/(a(1 − b)), the
Hamiltonian function is H˜1 = aKu + p˜1aK(1 − u), where p˜1 is the co-state
variable of Player 1. The maximum in u of H˜1 is b if p˜1 > 1, and c if p˜1 < 1.
Denoting the final function by F1 = aK(tS)(T − tS) then, for every t < tS2 ,
˙˜p1 = −∂H˜1
∂K
= − [au+ p˜1a(1− u)] , p˜1(tS2 ) =
∂F1
∂K(tS2 )
= a(T − tS2 ) , (9)
0 = H˜1(tS) +
∂F1
∂tS
. (10)
Using (9-10), a simple calculation shows that the (unique) switching point is
given by tS2 = T − 1/a, and does not depend on the parameter α. The following
table resumes the results obtained in the case of interior solution:
u(t) = b v(t) = 1 t ∈ [0, T − 1/a)∫ T
T−1/a u(t) dt = (1− α)/a v(t) = 0 t ∈ (T − 1/a, T ]
(11)
Note that, from (7), we have
∫ T
tS2
u dt = 1−αa . For instance, if we take a
constant control variable u = u¯ from tS2 to T , we obtain u¯ = 1 − α. Hence,
if 1 − α /∈ [b, c], the restriction (7) cannot be met. Therefore, the solution is
interior if, and only if, b ≤ 1− α ≤ c. Otherwise, we obtain a corner solution.
Case 2: Corner solutions. If α > 1− b or α < 1− c, the free final time tS2 takes
values in the boundary of the interval [T − α/(a(1− c)), T − α/(a(1− b))] and
we have to replace (10) by
H˜1(tS2 ) +
∂F1
∂tS2
≥ 0 if tS2 = T −
α
a(1− b) , and
H˜1(tS2 ) +
∂F1
∂tS2
≤ 0 if tS2 = T −
α
a(1− c) .
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Without loss of generality, let us assume a constant value for the control variable
u(t) throuhout the interval [tS2 , T ]. From (7) we obtain t
S
2 = T−α/(a(1−u(tS2 ))),
hence H˜1(tS2 ) +
∂F1
∂tS2
= aK(tS2 )(α− 1 + u(tS2 )).
1. If α > 1 − b, then H˜1(tS2 ) + ∂F1/∂tS2 > 0, so tS2 = T − α/(a(1 − b)). Since
p˜1(tS2 ) = α/(1− b) > 1, then u∗(t) = b, for every t ∈ [0, T ]. The we have:
u(t) = b v(t) = 1 t ∈ [0, T − α/(a(1− b)))
u(t) = b v(t) = 0 t ∈ [T − α/(a(1− b)), T ) (12)
2. If α < 1 − c, then H˜1(tS2 ) + ∂F1/∂tS2 < 0, so tS2 = T − α/(a(1 − c)) and
u∗(t) = c, for t ≥ tS2 . Now p˜1(tS2 ) = α/(1 − c) < 1, hence there exists tS1 such
that u∗(t) = b if t < tS1 , and u
∗(t) = c if t > tS1 . By solving (9) we obtain that
tS1 = T −
1
a(1− c) [α− ln (α+ c)] .
is the unique moment such that p˜1(tS1 ) = 1. Then we have
u(t) = b v(t) = 1 t ∈ [0, T − [α− ln (α+ c)]/(a(1− c))
u(t) = c v(t) = 1 t ∈ [T − [α− ln (α+ c)]/(a(1− c)), T − α/(a(1− c)))
u(t) = c v(t) = 0 t ∈ (T − α/(a(1− c)), T ]
(13)
3 Main results
Let us analyze the consequences of the existence of the parameter α.
Proposition 1 The maximum in α of the payment for Player 1, (JS1 )
∗, in the
open-loop Stackelberg equilibria, is achieved for every α ∈ [1− c, 1− b].
Proof: If the solution is interior, using (1), (8) and (11) it is easy to show that
JS1 does not depend on the value of the parameter α, i.e., ∂(J
S
1 )
∗/∂α = 0.
If α > 1− b, we have the corner solution (12). From (8) we obtain
(JS1 )
∗ = ab
∫ tS2
0
K dt+
α
1− bK(t
S
2 ) .
Hence, by integrating (1) and substituting in the previous expression we obtain
∂(JS1 )
∗
∂α
=
1− b− α
1− b K(t
S
2 ) < 0 .
Finally, if α < 1 − c, a similar calculation for the corner solution described in
(13) shows that, in this case,
∂(JS1 )
∗
∂α
> 0 . Then the result follows. 
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With respect to the second player, similar calculations shows that
∂(JS2 )
∗
∂α
= 0
if α ∈ (1− c, 1− b), and ∂(J
S
2 )
∗
∂α
< 0 if α > 1− b or α < 1− c. Therefore, Player
2 maximizes its payments when α takes the minimum value.
Let us compare the switching points in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria,
which characterize completely the solutions, so a coincidence in the switching
points implies equal payments for both players. Simple calculations illustrate
that, if the solution is interior, the switching points in the Nash and Stackelberg
equilibria coincide if, and only if, α = 1 − c. In the case of corner solutions, if
α < 1− c, the switching points always coincide. On the contrary, if α > 1− b,
the corresponding switching points do not coincide. As a corollary we obtain:
Proposition 2 If the parameter α takes the value α∗ = 1 − c, then the open-
loop and feedback Nash equilibria, and the open-loop and feedback Stackelberg
equilibria with Player 1 as the leader coincide.
Finally, we prove that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibria (with Player 1 as
the leader) give greater payments to both agents than the open-loop Nash equi-
librium.
Proposition 3 Both players prefer the open-loop Stackelberg equilibria to the
open-loop Nash equilibrium, i.e., (JS1 )
∗ ≥ (JN1 )∗ and (JS2 )∗ ≥ (JN2 )∗.
Proof: The result for Player 1 is straightforward (he is the leader). With respect
to Player 2, if α ≤ 1 − c, the switching point coincide, so (JS2 )∗ = (JN2 )∗. For
α ≥ 1− c, note that JN2 = K(tN2 ). If α > 1− b, several calculations show that
(JN2 )
∗ = K0e1(1−b)T−α(
1−b
1−c ) < K0e1(1−b)T−α = (JS2 )
∗ .
Finally, if α ∈ (1−c, 1−b), for the unique switching point in the Nash equilibrium
it is clear that
∂K(tN2 )
∂tN2
> 0, and also
∂tN2
∂α
< 0. Therefore,
∂(JN2 )
∗
∂α
< 0 and the
result follows (
∂(JS2 )
∗
∂α
= 0 in the interior solutions). 
From Propositions 1, 2 and 3, if α∗ = 1 − c the open-loop Stackelberg
equilibrium is time consistent, thus providing an answer to the main criticism
of this solution concept. Moreover, since the payments for Player 1 (and also for
Player 2 if α ≥ 1− c) are maximum in the open-loop Stackelberg equilibria for
α ∈ [1−c, 1−b], α∗ = 1−c can be seen as the maximizer of payments for Player
1 when the open-loop/feedback Nash equilibrium, or the feedback Stackelberg
solution with Player 1 as the leader, are considered. In the differential game
model between government and firms, α can be interpreted as a net wealth
tax, which is fixed by the government (Player 1). In the model of capitalism, it
seems more natural to assume that α is choosed as a consequence of a bargaining
process between the capitalist (Player 2) and workers (Player 1).
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